An industry mobilized to meet the nation’s needs, with key points of attention to avoid discrepancies.
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Context : a tool of power outside Europe
April 2023
China :
The civil maritime sector is under political influence.
China considers maritime power to be crucial to its economic security.
Most Chinese maritime assets are controlled by the state. The state wishes to develop cutting-edge maritime technologies.
China intends to own the world’s largest shipyard, CSSC (a merger of defense and civil shipbuilding yards), and the world’s leading shipping company, COSCO. The Communist Party controls these structures.
For the Chinese, the power of shipowners is inseparable from the power of a military navy.
The Chinese are encouraging cooperation with European companies and research centers on dual technologies, which shows great naivety.
At this stage, no defensive response has been made by the European Commission or Member States, despite warnings from the shipbuilding sector (SEA EUROPE) and European shipping companies.
To put it in a nutshell : ‘every Chinese ship is a warship’.
in europe :
The Maritime security strategy does not take into account the need to possess a so-called strategic fleet
In France :
moving from voluntary naval control using existing resources to a comprhensive strategic fleet policy
USA :
The USA has the United States Merchant Marine, which is the merchant navy of the United States (a fleet of civilian merchant ships operated by the private sector or by the US federal government). In peacetime, this fleet transports cargo or passengers, but in wartime, it becomes an auxiliary fleet of the United States Navy and, as such, may be called upon to transport troops or supplies for the US armed forces.
The US merchant navy is a civilian auxiliary of the US Navy and in wartime, in accordance with the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, sailors are considered military personnel.
The federal government maintains fleets of merchant ships through structures such as the Military Sealift Command and the National Defense Reserve Fleet.
Highly protectionist and despite WTO rules, the Jones Act of 1920 requires ships engaged in coastal trade in the United States to be built in the United States, fly the American flag, be owned by an American, and have an American crew.
This represents approximately 500 ships and more than 60,000 personnel.
The EU does not encourage Member States to own a merchant fleet by flying their flag and does not envisage a European version of the Jones Act.
The recent update to the EU Maritime Security Strategy and Action Plan (communication of 10 March 2023) does not highlight the connection between owning a merchant fleet (for auxiliary purposes) and EU maritime security in the face of threats on its doorstep.
Furthermore, the EU’s Military Mobility Action Plan, launched in 2018 and recently in its second phase, with €1.7 billion already earmarked for dual-use transport infrastructure, does not include any maritime transport component and only multimodal transport for the hinterland, which excludes the auxiliary fleet that European shipyards are calling for.
The concept of a strategic fleet is not only the ability to mobilize existing civilian vessels flying the French flag for logistics and personnel transport missions (and is therefore primarily a matter for shipowners), but also a matter of war economy and therefore of being able to build ships (mainly for energy supply and personnel transport, or even coastal shipping) to maintain sea power on a par with what China will be able to develop on the one hand and the US merchant navy on the other, thanks to the Jones Act.
A European dimension must be introduced, with the possibility of introducing a greater maritime dimension into the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, which for the moment is very much focused on rail and road transport.
The national need for a strategic fleet must lead, for example, to the acquisition of roll-on/roll-off vessels, ferries or oil/gas tankers built in France, so as to be ready to have national production chains capable of accelerating if necessary.
There is also the issue of territorial continuity, particularly for our overseas territories.
The State could assist shipping companies in their acquisition decisions in order to mitigate the cost differential between acquiring a ship from a non-European shipyard and one from a national chain. The additional cost is estimated at around 20%. This could be achieved through tax incentives or any other relevant measures.
There is also the issue of training and availability of French crews.
We must not spread ourselves too thinly but rather move towards a comprehensive policy that includes all aspects: shipowners, shipbuilders and crews.