Review of the 2024-2030 Military Programming law project

an industry mobilized to meet the nation’s needs : key points of attention to avoid gaps

Regarding programs structural to the survival of the BITD (Defense Industrial and Technological Base), specifically SN3G (3rd Generation SSBN) and PA NG (Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier), and as GICAN has indicated since 2022, the adherence to the initial schedule and milestones in this draft is welcomed.

For the surface fleet, with the presentation of 2030 objectives and the 2035 format, several points requiring attention or clarification must be highlighted, such as:

• Actual combat capability of platforms, directly derived from the level and type of onboard equipment.

• The level of ‘modernization’ granted to the two Horizon-class air defense frigates (FDA), which are intended to remain first-rank frigates beyond 2035, as well as the ATM3 (third major refit) for the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier.

• Visibility for industry regarding the Offshore Patrol Vessel (PH) program, with a contractual target to be specified between 7 and 10 units.

• The production rate of “corvettes” and their planned characteristics (including the hypothesis of a European cooperation program) to replace Surveillance Frigates (FS) for sovereignty forces, with a first delivery in 2030 and a very ambitious target of 6 units before 2035.

• The launch of the PEM “EVOL frigates” (Frigate Evolution Major Program), which rumors suggest may be delayed.

Regarding mine warfare, this represents a capability revolution; however, its ambition must not suffer delays, as the 2030 capability target may appear to be a step back compared to current assets, which are significantly more mature. The technological challenge is major and deserves specific attention.

For seabed warfare (mastery of the deep sea), GICAN welcomes the establishment of such a capability by 2030 and urges reliance on domestic industry for these necessary innovations, rather than settling for ‘off-the-shelf’ products from third-party countries.

Finally, regarding the section on ‘priority efforts for future armies’ (paragraph 2.2.3 of the annexed report, starting on page 107), GICAN questions the breakdown of these priorities and, above all, their point of application. Which of these concern the naval sector, and what is the budgetary distribution?

Programs delays justified by insufficient capacity of certain industrial players ?

We find no trace of such justification in the Military Programming Law (LPM) draft presented to Parliament. The industry is fully capable of meeting the Nation’s needs.

Ours is an industry of long-term cycles. If anticipation and contracts are finalized early enough—a key concern of the Ministry of Armed Forces and the DGA (Directorate General of Armaments)—production bottlenecks can be avoided.

The industry knows how to scale its production rates smoothly, provided the State allows for proper anticipation. For example, Naval Group Lorient is capable of producing a first-rank frigate every six months and corvettes at an even higher frequency. Chantiers de l’Atlantique has the capacity to increase the assembly rate of hull sections.

If additional production infrastructure is required (dry docks, integration platforms, production lines, etc.), investing in these facilities and in skill recruitment must be part of a genuine policy. This policy must bring together the private sector (banks, private financing bodies) and the public sector (local authorities where the infrastructure is located, the State, development agencies, training organizations, etc.).

requisition regime

We endorse the need to modernize provisions in this area to face evolving threats. However, the economic impact on companies must be taken into consideration. Work must continue on the modernization of the “strategic fleet” concept (developing a flagged fleet and stimulating domestic civil shipbuilding).

Position on the authorities’ power to order defense companies to establish a “minimum stock of strategic materials or components” and on the “prioritization” mechanism created by Article 24 of the LPM. Industry must stand ready to accelerate production rates. Contractual and compensation conditions must be strictly defined with a focus on economic performance. State-provided guarantees, requirements for the upstream industrial sector (mining sector, role of OFREMI), and the contribution of the logistics/transport sector for storage and delivery should allow for a joint effort between the industrial sector and public authorities on this issue.

“Prioritization” must not weaken our dual-use companies that compete in the civil sector against aggressive international groups and which we must protect (e.g., Alcatel-Lucent, Schneider Electric, etc.). A pragmatic approach inspired by the U.S. Defense Production Act could be justified.

The more we promote reindustrialization, the reshoring of component production, and the processing of raw materials, the more strategic maneuver room we will gain in this field.

Exports

Exports are fundamental to mitigating the risks facing our industry. The export support (SOUTEX) provided by the French Navy and the DGA is indispensable and can be further improved. What is certain is that the delay of certain domestic programs will create a need to find export customers. Beyond simple risk-taking, the entire weapons export support system will need to be redesigned for greater efficiency. This cannot be limited to the DGA alone. The State’s entire export apparatus must organize to be more aggressive on international markets (DGA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treasury, cooperative agencies, other public bodies, etc.), following the example of countries like the United Kingdom, which has defined a 30-year shipbuilding strategy with a dedicated export support pillar.

Companies are taking risks and investing their own funds (for example, the underwater drone center of excellence in La Londe). They share the conviction that without exports, our industry will not be viable and will be unable to guarantee the development of sovereign solutions for our country. Regarding export contracts specifically, a key question arises: should we cover all risks with contingency provisions—at the risk of seeing our proposed price exceed that of the competition—or should we follow competitors who reduce their provisions but act more aggressively through contract amendments? This is the legacy of DGA-led programs, which aim to “de-risk” every project, unlike Anglo-Saxon models that often operate on a cost-plus-fee basis.

European cooperation

GICAN believes that support mechanisms (European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO, joint procurement, Horizon Europe, etc.) are advancing the reality of a European EDTIB (European Defence Technological and Industrial Base). The naval industry is resolutely committed to improved bilateral and multilateral cooperation within Europe. In the face of non-European competition, this is a path toward maintaining an autonomous and sovereign industry for the benefit of Member States. This is particularly true for the naval sector, regarding technological building blocks for future ships, semi-autonomous systems, mine warfare, and the emblematic “European Patrol Corvette” project, supported by both PESCO and the EDF.

For an industry characterized by long-term cycles, the challenge is transitioning to “joint” production for certain capabilities after 2027, following the R&D and development investments stimulated by the European Defence Fund before that date. This is the objective of the EDIP (European Defence Investment Programme) and the negotiations on the MFF (Multiannual Financial Framework – the EU budget from 2027 onwards), which should lead to a “European preference” in joint procurement.

Regarding innovation, for instance, what exactly do these €10 billion cover? How is the industry involved regarding the use of dual-use technologies and disruptive innovation? What proportion is dedicated to underwater technologies?

For drones and robotics (€5 billion), it is difficult to decipher this aggregate, which includes loitering munitions (MTO), mine warfare, and seabed warfare, to name only a few of the highlighted technologies.

Regarding the €5 billion for surface-to-air defense, European cooperation on responding to hypersonic threats makes sense; however, collaborative combat is not explicitly mentioned, even though a genuine programmatic approach would be useful from our perspective. Furthermore, the delay in renewing the naval segment of very-short-range missiles beyond 2035 requires clarification.

Behind the impressive figure of €13 billion for overseas sovereignty, which undeniably holds sectoral industrial opportunities, the portion dedicated to maritime surveillance via new sensors, the naval component, and port infrastructure for local maintenance should be specified as soon as possible. Moreover, a link between the Military Programming Law (LPM) and other legislative projects, such as the Green Industry Bill, should be considered—for example, to enable the development of infrastructure required to maintain French Navy vessels within these territories.

Finally, €2 billion are allocated for special forces; GICAN will closely monitor the component related to surface and underwater vehicles, which are key drivers of capability superiority.